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DONALD A. COY, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent. 
[1] Witnesses - Privileged Communications - Public Officers.-
,V hen the Prosecution seeks to show reasonable cause for a 
search by testimony as to communications from an informer, 
either the identity of the informer must be disclosed when 
defendant seeks disclosure or such testimony must be struck 
on proper motion by defendant. 
[2] Id.-Privileged Communications-Public Officers.-Where no 
motion to strike a police officer's testimony at the preliminary 
hearing of a narcotics case was made after disclosure of the 
identity of an informer was refused, and neither in his objec-
tion to the introduction of the narcotics in evidence nor by 
argument elsewhere did defendant indicate that he was rely-
ing on refusal to identify the informer to establish illegality 
of the arrest and search, the magistrate did not err in sustain-
ing an objection to thc question asking the informer's identity, 
since the prosecution was entitled to elect between disclosure 
and having the officer's testimony struck, and it was incumbent 
on defendant to compel this election by moving to strike or 
otherwise making his position clear. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the· Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County from trying a criminal case. 
Writ denied. 
John P. Brown and J. C. Radzik for Petitioner. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William B. McKes-
Bon, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Ralph F. Bagley, 
Jere J. Sullivan, Lewis Watnick and Robert Lederman, 
Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR J.-An information filed by the District Attor-
ney of Los Angeles County charged defendant with possessing 
narcotics in violation of Health and Safety Code, section 
11500. His motion to set aside the information under Penal 
Code, section 995, was denied, and he now seeks a writ of 
prohibition to prevent his trial. 
On June 11, 1958, Officer Hill of the Los Angeles Police 
Department Narcotics Division received information from a 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 31 j Am.Jur., Witnesses, §§ 535, 
536. 
KcK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Witnesses, § 60. 
) 
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confidential informer that defendant was in possession of nar-
cotics and that the room he occupied in a rooming house was 
being used as a "shooting gallery," a place where addicts 
congregate to use narcotics. The informer accompanied 
Officers Hill and Loreste to the neighborhood of the rooming 
house and pointed out the building and the room defendant 
occupied. 
An hour or so later, the officers entered the rooming house 
with the permission of the landlady, who accompanied them 
upstairs to defendant's room. As they approached the room, 
the door opened and defendant emerged dressed in a bathrobe. 
The landlady indicated that he was the person the officers 
had inquired about, and they placed him under arrest. The 
officers had no warrant. When the officers searched defend-
ant's person after the arrest, they found narcotics and para-
phernalia for their use in the pockets of his bathrobe. 
Defendant admitted that the narcotics were his, that he had 
purchased them that morning, and that he was on his way to 
the bathroom to take a fix. 
The informer was not present at the arrest, and took no 
other part than to supply information of defendant's posses-
sion and show the officers the location of defendant's residence. 
At the preliminary hearing, Officer Hill testified to the fore-
going facts. He also testified that the informer had provided 
accurate information in the past that led to the arrest of three 
persons for unlawful possession of narcotics. He stated that 
in his opinion the informer was a reliable source of informa-
tion and that he had relied upon him in making the arrest 
in the present case. 
On cross-examination, Officer Hill was asked the identity 
of the informer. The prosecution's objection was sustained 
on the ground that the informer's identity was privileged. 
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 5.) After the cross-exam-
ination, the prosecution sought to introduce into evidence the 
narcotics found on defendant's person after the arrest. 
Defendant's objection on the ground that they had been 
obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure was over-
ruled. Defendant was committed and held for trial and his 
motion to set aside the commitment was denied. . 
Defendaut contends that since the identity of the informer 
was not disclosed, the officers could not justify the arrest on 
the basis of the informer's information; that the arrest was 
therefore illegal and the evidence obtained as a result thereof 
inadmissible; and that accordingly the writ should issue sinee 
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there was no competent evidence to support the commitment. 
(Priestly v. Sttperior Court, 50 Ca1.2d 812, 815 [330 P.2d 39] ; 
Ba.dillo v. Superior Court, 46 Ca1.2d 269, 271 [294 P.2d 23].) 
[1] In the Priestly case we held that "when the prosecution 
seeks to show reasonable cause for a search by testimony as 
to communications from an informer, either the identity of 
the informer must be disclosed when the defendant seeks 
disclosure or such testimony must be struck on propcr motion 
of the defendant." (50 Ca1.2d at 819.) 
[2] In the present ease no motion to strike the officer's 
testimony was made after the identity of the informer was 
refused, and neither in his objection to the introduction of the 
narcotics in evidence nor by argument elsewhere in the record 
did defendant indicate that he was relying on the refusal to 
identify the informer to establish the illegality of the arrest 
and search. The magistrate did not err in sustaining the 
objection to the question asking the identity of the informer, 
for the prosecution was entitled to elect between disclosure 
and having the officer's testimony struck. It was incum-
bent on defendant to compel this election, however, by 
nloving to strike or otherwise making his position clear. The 
prosecution may have had evidence other than the informa-
tion of the informer to justify the search or it may have been 
willing to waive the privilege of nondisclosure if its case would 
otherwise fail, and it was entitled to an opportunity to produce 
such evidence or waive nondisclosure. It was not called upon 
to do 80, however, while evidence of reasonable cause stood 
unchallenged in the record. To hold that the magistrate 
or trial court must strike the evidence on its own motion 
when the objection to it has not been called to its attention 
would open the door to needless repetitions of preliminary 
bearings. It would also permit the defendant to gamble on 
an acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a con-
"iction would be reversed on appeal and a new trial ordered. 
No nndue burden is placed on the defendant by requiring 
him to make a motion to strike when the basis for exclud-
ing evidence theretofore properly admitted becom('s apparent, 
and there is no basis for departing from the settled rule 
requiring such a motion (City of Venice v. Short Li'IJ.c Beach 
Land Co. (1919), 180 Cal. 447, 453 [181 P. 658] ; Ballos v. 
Na·l1mll (1928),93 Ca1.App. 601, 608 [269 P. 972] ; Brandt v. 
ll"v!lh (l!JI0), 14 Ca1.App. 39, 56 [111 P. 275J ; Fricke, Cali-
fornia Criminal Evidence, 444-445 (4th ed. 1957» in the 
present situation. 
) 
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The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ 
is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter J., Schauer, J., Sp<'ucc, J., and Mc-
Comb, J., concurred. 
